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Abstract
Leading theories of legislative party influence argue that legislators gain 
appreciable benefits from winning their preferred committee assignments. 
Control over the committee assignment process is therefore thought to be 
among the most powerful tool party leaders have to incentivize party loyalty.
However, evaluating the degree to which legislators actually benefit from 
winning their preferred assignments – and therefore to what degree control 
over assignments represents an important disciplinary tool for party leaders 
– has been challenging with observational data. This paper sheds unique 
light on the benefits legislators accrue from winning their preferred 
committee assignments by exploiting unique rules in Arkansas’ state 
legislature, where legislators select their own committee assignments in a 
randomized order. The natural experiment indicates that legislators reap at 
most limited rewards from winning their preferred assignments. This 
suggests that committee seats have at best limited use as inducements.
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A great deal of literature argues that legislators who win their 
preferred committee assignments gain significant advantages (e.g., Fenno 
1973; Mayhew 1974; Grimmer and Powell 2013).1 Smith (2000, p. 62) 
summarizes this scholarly consensus as follows: “Tangible incentives come 
in many other forms, although few are as important as committee 
assignments to most legislators.” 
The existence and magnitude of these advantages is important to 
understand because leading theories of legislative politics posit that party 
leaders induce party loyalty among the rank and file in large part by 
rewarding loyal legislators with their preferred committee assignments (e.g., 
Rohde and Shepsle 1973; Crook and Hibbing 1985; Coker and Crain 1994; 
Sinclair 1995; Stratmann 2000; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; Roberts and 
Smith 2003; Kanthak 2004). For example, Cox and McCubbins (1993, p. 175) 
use their finding that “loyalty to the party leadership is a statistically and 
substantively important determinant of who gets what [committee] 
assignment” to conclude that the committee assignment process makes 
legislators “more responsive to both the party’s leadership and goals” (p. 
182).
We present novel evidence on the benefits that legislators accrue from
winning their preferred committee assignments. Our evidence comes from 
Arkansas’ state legislature, where parties play no role in making standing 
committee assignments; instead, legislators choose their own assignments in
1 We know of only one study in the large literature on committee assignments that has 
suggested the benefits to legislators are limited (Bullock 1972).
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the order of their seniority. Crucially, for legislators who have served the 
same length of time, this seniority order is determined by a random lottery. 
Some members are thus randomly assigned to have a better opportunity to 
select their preferred assignments, a situation equivalent to randomly 
assigning party leaders’ intention to reward some members with access to 
their most preferred committee assignments. 
We exploit this randomized lottery to test whether legislators who have
a more complete and higher quality slate of committee assignments to 
choose from gain appreciable benefits over those who are forced to accept 
the assignments no other legislators want. In contrast to a great deal of 
previous observational work, the results from the randomized lottery suggest
that legislators are not significantly more likely to attain any of their principal
goals as a result of attaining their preferred assignments. This evidence 
suggests that the benefits individual legislators derive from having better 
committee assignments are too meager to form a plausible basis for party 
power.
Experimental Design: The Randomized Committee Lottery in 
Arkansas
The random assignment of Arkansas legislators to their order in the 
committee assignment process occurs as follows. Each legislator in 
Arkansas’ two state legislative chambers has a seniority number, and 
legislators choose their own standing committee assignments in the order of 
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this seniority number.2 This seniority number is first determined by how long 
a member has served in the chamber, with the lowest numbers (and thus the
first choice of committee assignments) going to those who have served 
longest. Crucially, however, the seniority number of legislators who have 
served the same length of time is randomly determined: before their first 
term, legislators draw numbers written on slips of paper out of a hat to 
determine their seniority within their freshman class. Their relative seniority 
within their cohort stays with them for the remainder of their time in the 
legislature.
The Independent Variable: Relative Rank
Although legislators’ seniority is randomized across their entire cohort, 
committee assignments in the House are allotted within four separate 
‘caucus districts’ corresponding to the four congressional districts in 
Arkansas. Because only a certain pre-set number of legislators from each 
caucus district can sit on each committee, House members only compete 
with legislators in their caucus district for committee seats.
Table 1 presents a fictional 25-member Arkansas House populated with
legislators in their first or second term to illustrate how we operationalize the
randomization within these chamber-cohort-caucus district groupings. 
Legislators in their first term have lower seniority numbers than the 
legislators in their second term. However, because seniority within each 
2 Legislators serve on two standing committees. Legislators choose their first committee in 
the order of seniority and then choose their second committee in the same order. As Figure 
1 shows and we discuss, this arrangement leads to significant heterogeneity in the quality of
legislators’ committee assignments, with legislators choosing first systematically serving on 
different committees who choose later in the process.
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cohort is randomly determined, what matters for the natural experiment is 
one’s seniority rank within one’s chamber-cohort-caucus district group. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE]
The resulting Relative Rank metric is shown for our fictional legislature 
in part (b) of Table 1. Legislators are arranged in groups by their cohort and 
caucus district and then sorted by their randomized seniority number within 
these groups because legislators pick their own assignments in direct 
succession within these groups. Thus, for example, within caucus district A, 
legislator 4 would pick first, followed by legislator 6 and 11. Once the senior 
members finish picking, legislators 14, 15, 18, and 23 would then pick the 
remainder of the assignments allocated to district A. 
The relative rank metric gives the percentile ranking of each 
legislator’s lottery number relative to the legislators in their year-chamber-
cohort-caucus district on a 0 to 1 scale. Legislators assigned to 1 are the 
most senior in their year-chamber-cohort-caucus district group (and thus can
select the best committee assignment available to those in their caucus 
district elected at the same time) and legislators with a 0 are the least 
senior. Likewise, a relative rank value of 0.5 would mean that the legislator is
at the 50th percentile and chooses in the middle of her group.
We use relative rank as our main independent variable for the analysis 
because it has a comparable meaning across the different year-chamber-
cohort-caucus district groups. It is important to use a measure that is 
comparable across these groups because we are not looking at one 
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experiment in the analysis; instead, we are pooling and analyzing the results 
from a series of many smaller experiments, one in each year-chamber-
cohort-caucus district group (see Table 1). This is also the reason we drop 
legislators who have no peers in their cohort and caucus district (such as 
legislator 13 in Table 1) from the analysis; these legislators have no 
counterfactual observations for comparison. We account for this pooling 
across the year-chamber-cohort-caucus district groups by including fixed 
effects for these groups in the analysis. 
Contrasting Relative Rank And Typical Measures of Legislative Committee 
Assignments
Box 1 compares the committee assignment process in Arkansas to the 
process elsewhere in order to illustrate the benefits of studying this question 
in the Arkansas context.  
Box 1. Comparing Relative Rank and Typical Measures of Legislative 
Committee Quality
Typical Assignment Process
Party Leader
Regard
 Desirability of
Committee
for Each
Legislator
 Outcomes
Endogenous,
Measured
with Proxy
Endogenous,
Measured
with Proxy
Measured
Arkansas Assignment Process
Randomized
Lottery
Number
 Desirability of
Committee
for Each
Legislator
 Outcomes
Exogenous,
Measurable
Unmeasured Measured
The top half of Box 1 depicts the committee assignment process in 
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most legislatures and how scholars typically measure it. First, party leaders 
are thought to hold some legislators in higher regard than others as a result 
of their service and loyalty to the party. This regard cannot be measured 
directly and is sometimes proxied with party unity scores (e.g., Cox and 
McCubbins 2005). This party leader regard is also endogenous to other 
aspects of the legislators’ career that might influence their assignments and 
their legislative behavior, such as the safeness of their seat. Next, this 
regard is thought to influence the quality of legislators’ committee 
assignments. Assignment quality cannot be measured directly because some
assignments may have greater value for some legislators than others – for 
example, an assignment to the Agriculture committee may have significantly
more value to a legislator from a rural area than one from a city center. 
Further assignment quality is potentially endogenous to other factors party 
leaders use to make choices unrelated to their regard for the legislator (e.g., 
marginality of the district). To study the committee assignment process, 
existing studies typically examine the associations between various 
outcomes (e.g., re-election margins) and these proxies for party leader 
regard and committee quality.
By contrast, consider the committee assignment process in Arkansas 
and the measures available there. Instead of party leaders choosing which 
legislators to reward with their preferred assignments, the randomized 
lottery determines which legislators will select their preferred assignments. 
Unlike the regard party leaders have for legislators, this first stage of the 
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assignment process (relative rank) is exogenous and can be measured in 
Arkansas.
We cannot directly measure the desirability of each committee to each
legislator. However, as with other studies, we are not ultimately interested in
the effects of legislators winning particular committee assignments; we are 
interested in the effect of an in increase in legislators’ ability to select their 
preferred assignment. Because relative rank is randomly determined in 
Arkansas, we can measure the impact of legislators having a better chance 
of getting their preferred assignments (the first stage of the process) directly
on their outcomes; similar to the exogenous dose of party leader regard we 
would ideally deliver in other legislatures. Although there are undoubtedly 
other factors that influence whether legislators achieve their goals, these 
factors will be uncorrelated with the assignment mechanism in our data – the
randomized lottery – whereas in traditional data they may be highly 
correlated with the assignment mechanism – the strategic decisions party 
leaders make.
Data and Dependent Variables
Our analysis uses 2,173 legislator-term observations from the period 
1977-2011.3 We analyze sixteen dependent variables related to four aspects 
of legislators’ careers and goals on which the literature has consistently 
argued that winning preferred assignments has large effects: legislators’ 
3 There are 2,431 legislator-term observations during this period. However, only 2,173 of 
these observations are used because some legislators were the only ones elected in their 
caucus district in their cohort, and thus were not subject to any randomization, and because 
some committee assignment data was missing from 1977.
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electoral success, chamber leadership, policy productivity, and roll call 
voting. 
For electoral goals, we used data from Carsey et al. (2007) and the 
Arkansas Secretary of State’s website on whether each legislator won re-
election, lost their primary re-election, lost their general re-election, ran for 
or won higher office, retired, was opposed in the general election, and was 
opposed in the primary election, as well as their general and primary election
vote shares. We collected the amount of campaign money that each 
incumbent raised from www.followthemoney.org.
For chamber leadership, we collected data from the Arkansas 
Legislative Digest on whether legislators served in party or official chamber 
leadership.
Policy productivity variables were only available for the years 2005-
2008. For those years we collected data from the Arkansas Legislative Digest
on the number of bills legislators filed and the number of bills they passed, a 
metric many other scholars have used to measure policy productivity and 
effectiveness.
Last, we used members’ roll call votes from 1997-2010 to construct 
three final dependent variables about their voting and party loyalty: 
members’ extremity (based on their W-NOMINATE score); the percentage of 
the time they vote with their party on roll calls where the majority of 
Democrats opposed the majority of Republicans (Party Unity); and the 
percentage of the time they vote with their party on roll calls where the 
9
majority of Democrats opposed the majority of Republicans and their party 
lost the vote, i.e., when the majority of their party is rolled (Party Unity 
(Losing Votes)).
Results: Are Committee Assignments Valuable To Legislators?
The Supplementary Materials show that the legislative randomization 
produces comparisons groups of legislators balanced on pre-treatment 
covariates and that the randomization has clear effects on legislators’ 
committee seats. Specifically, Table A1 in the Supplementary Materials 
presents a randomization check that shows the expected covariate balance 
across the legislators and districts. Table A2 presents a manipulation check 
showing that legislators who select committees first do tend to end up on the
‘top committees’ in the legislature much more often than those who do not.
Table 2 presents our estimates of the benefits legislators gain by 
obtaining their preferred committee assignments. In all the regressions the 
independent variable is Relative Rank, the scaled randomized seniority of 
legislators within their year-chamber-cohort-caucus district that allows them 
to pick from a much larger and more desirable set of committees. Because 
Relative Rank varies from 0 to 1, the coefficient on this variable indicates the
estimated difference between the most and least senior member within each
cohort – that is, between the cohort members who have the most and least 
choice in their assignments. These limiting cases are roughly analogous to 
the situations in which a hypothetical party leader wished to reward a loyal 
legislator with the best available committee assignment that more senior 
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members had not already taken or, alternatively, consign a disloyal one to 
the last remaining assignment after all others legislators’ wishes were 
granted.4
The dependent variables, each described in the previous section, are 
listed under each of the headings in Table 2. For each outcome we present 
the results from a regression without any fixed effects and the results from a 
regression with fixed effects for year-chamber-cohort-caucus district (i.e., the
groups within which the randomizations occur). Table 2 shows that 
legislators’ relative rank does not have a statistically significant effect on any
measures of their election outcomes. Legislators who have their pick of 
desirable committee assignments are not meaningfully more likely to win 
their primary or general election bids, raise campaign money, run for or win 
for higher office, deter opponents, or increase their vote share. We also find 
that legislators are no more likely to write nor pass bills as a result of their 
seniority. Further seniority does not affect legislators’ probability of 
becoming a party leader, nor how they vote.5
In their totality, the results of the analysis are clear and highly 
4 Legislators can be expected to choose their most preferred available choice since they 
choose for themselves (i.e., in a “serial dictatorship” arrangement; see Satterthwaite and 
Sonnenschein 1981).
5 This finding also rules out an alternative explanation for the null findings, namely that 
legislators do receive electoral benefits from more attractive committee assignments but 
use this additional ‘political capital’ to vote more extremely. In this way, committee 
membership might grant members additional leeway to vote against their constituents’ 
preferences (Cain, Ferejohn, Fiorina 1987, p. 87). However, the results show that legislators 
with more attractive committee assignments are neither more likely to be extreme nor more
likely to vote with their party. Likewise, the consistent null results across the large number 
of variables we tested suggests that legislators do not use ‘political capital’ from their 
committee assignments in order to help them achieve other goals. The reliable pattern in 
other legislatures that party leaders place more loyal legislators on more prestigious 
committees may be a result of party leader attempts to stack committees with reliable 
loyalists.
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surprising in light of decades of scholars’ conventional wisdom about the 
benefits legislators accrue from winning their preferred committee 
assignments. We find no statistically significant effects for a legislators’ 
seniority on the outcomes of interest we identified (with a generous 
threshold of p < 0.10). Further, our estimates are based on a large number 
of observations and have substantively small standard errors. For example, 
the 95% confidence interval for the estimate of the decreased probability 
that a legislator loses a general election because of their seniority extends 
only to 1.2 percentage points. The benefits legislators may reap from having 
an upper hand in the committee assignment process are meager at best.6
Discussion
The results of the naturally occurring randomized experiment in 
Arkansas’ state legislative committee assignment process suggest that 
legislators reap at most relatively minor benefits from winning their 
preferred committee assignments. These results speak to longstanding 
debates about whether party leaders can use the committee assignment 
process to meaningfully incentivize party loyalty. Because the benefits of 
winning one’s preferred assignments appear to be quite small while the 
electoral costs for voting out of step with their constituents are quite high 
(e.g., Fiorina 1974; Canes-Wrone, Brady, and Cogan 2002; Masket and 
Greene 2011), our evidence suggests that the committee assignment 
process is unlikely to plausibly form an important basis for the formidable 
power over legislators’ roll call votes parties appear to exercise (e.g, Fowler 
6
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and Hall 2013).  
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Table 1. Hypothetical Example of how Relative Rank is computed
(a)
Grouped by Cohort and
Seniority
(b)
Grouped by Cohort Caucus District, and
Seniority
Term
Numbe
r
(Cohor
t)
Rando
m
Seniori
ty
Caucus
District
Term
Number
(Cohort)
Rando
m
Seniori
ty
Caucus
Distric
t
Relativ
e Rank
2 1 D 2 4 A 1
2 2 B 2 6 A .5
2 3 B 2 11 A 0
2 4 A 2 2 B 1
2 5 B 2 3 B .67
2 6 A 2 5 B .33
2 7 C 2 9 B 0
2 8 D 2 7 C 1
2 9 B 2 10 C 0
2 10 C 2 1 D 1
2 11 A 2 8 D 0
1 12 D 1 14 A 1
1 13 B 1 15 A .67
1 14 A 1 18 A .33
1 15 A 1 23 A 0
1 16 C 1 13 B -
1 17 C 1 16 C 1
1 18 A 1 17 C .67
1 19 D 1 20 C .33
1 20 C 1 25 C 0
1 21 D 1 12 D 1
1 22 D 1 19 D .75
1 23 A 1 21 D .5
1 24 D 1 22 D .25
1 25 C 1 24 D 0
Notes: This table illustrates how relative rank is calculated using a 
hypothetical 25-member Arkansas House populated with legislators who 
were either just elected or are serving their second term. 
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Table 2. Effect of Seniority within Cohort (Relative Rank) on Outcomes of Interest (OLS)
Electoral Goals
Win Reelection Lose Primary Lose General Run for Higher
Office
Win Higher
Office
Retire
F.E. No F.E. F.E. No F.E. F.E. No F.E. F.E. No
F.E.
F.E. No
F.E.
F.E. No
F.E.
Coeff
.
Std. 
Error
0.012
(0.02
1)
0.026
(0.029)
-
0.001
(0.01
0)
-0.004
(0.010)
0.001
(0.006)
0.001
(0.006)
-0.002
(0.012)
-0.002
(0.012
)
0.008
(0.00
9)
0.008
(0.009
)
-
0.009
(0.01
8)
-0.018
(0.023
)
# 
Obs.
# 
F.E.
1,875
433
1,875
-
1,875
433
1,875
-
1,875
433
1,875
-
2,084
441
2,084
-
2,084
441
2,084
-
1,875
433
1,875
-
Opposed in General Opposed in
Primary
Vote Share in
General
Vote Share in
Primary
Money Raised
F.E. No F.E. F.E. No F.E. F.E. No F.E. F.E. No
F.E.
F.E. No
F.E.
Coeff
.
Std. 
Error
0.014
(0.01
9)
0.010
(0.020)
0.005
(0.02
0)
0.000
(0.021)
-0.012
(0.031)
-0.016
(0.020)
-0.026
(0.038)
-0.006
(0.022
)
-9164
(6512
)
-2895
(6327)
# 
Obs.
# 
F.E.
1,875
433
1,875
-
1,875
433
1,875
-
207
133
207
-
223
163
223
-
453
61
453
-
Chamber Goal Policy Productivity Goals Roll Call Voting
Serve as Chamber
Leader
Number of Bills
Filed
Number of Bills
Passed Party Unity
Party Unity 
(Losing Votes)
Extremity
(W-Nominate)
F.E. No F.E. F.E. No F.E. F.E. No F.E. F.E. No
F.E.
F.E. No
F.E.
F.E. No
F.E.
Coeff
.
Std. 
Error
-
0.002
(0.01
3)
-0.002
(0.013)
-2.83
(1.85
)
-2.54
(2.19)
-0.74
(1.25)
-0.56
(1.51)
0.002
(0.013)
0.001
(0.014
)
-
0.005
(0.02
2)
-0.003
(0.024
)
-
0.005
(0.03
2)
-0.005
(0.032
)
# 
Obs.
# 
2,084
441
2,084
-
264
30
264
-
264
30
264
-
1,043
133
1,043
-
1,001
133
1,001 1,040
133
1,040
-
18
F.E.
Notes: Fixed effects refer to the groups in which the randomization takes place (i.e. for each year-
chamber-cohort-caucus district group). The independent variable for all regressions, relative rank, is the 
scaled random seniority rank of each legislator within their randomization group. The variable ranges from 
0 to 1, with legislators assigned to 1 as the most senior. Coefficients represent the estimated effects of 
being the most senior member instead of the least senior member. No outcomes are significant at the 0.10
level. Ns differ in regressions with dependent variables for which data is not available for all years.
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